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Workers' Compensation
H. Alston Johnson*

I.

EXCLUSIVITY OF REMEDY

The most prominent topic in this past term's cases, and indeed those of the
last several terms, is the scope of the exclusive remedy in the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act). The thin line between a mandatory workers'
compensation remedy and a potential tort remedy has become more blurred since
the substantial amendments in 1989. Those amendments, generally speaking,
made the compensation remedy more difficult to obtain, leaving open the
possibility that some injured workers would find themselves with no recovery
under the Act. Some commentators, including the writer, had suggested that if
the history of workers' compensation in Louisiana meant anything at all, we
could expect to see the judiciary expand potential tort remedies to match the
concomitant decrease in compensation remedies. The decisions of the last
several years in a variety of related subjects confirm this pattern so clearly that
it can no longer be denied.
The pattern can be detected in a number of areas, and the story is by no
means new. From the inception of the Workers' Compensation Act in 1914,
both the employee and the employer could seek a tort remedy against a "third
person," and to that extent the Act was not truly a no-fault system. Predictably,
there has been endless controversy about who is a "third person" for these
purposes.
Thus, from the beginning, the workplace was never entirely roped off from
the tort system. Looking over the boundary into the promised land, the
employee nearly always felt the grass was greener on the other side of that fence.
Certainly the employee often achieved recovery in workplace incidents against
an employer who had previously been victorious; but the recovery was limited
and probably slower than it was intended to be. The shades of green that the
employee saw on the other side of the fence became deeper as major theories of
strict liability developed in the tort system that was largely closed to her.
The courts have had a significant role to play in this story. Discovering that
there were only a very few ways, if any at all, to permit the employee to evade
the tort immunity of the employer, and indeed for a number of years not really
believing that tort immunity should be evaded, the judiciary set about to broaden
the scope of workers' compensation coverage to the maximum permissible
extent. In a period that seemed to run roughly from 1950 to about 1980, the
decisions broadly interpreted the Act to reach most, and indeed nearly all,
workplace incidents. Space limitations do not permit a complete chronicle of
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these developments, but one need only reflect on what became of the supposed
requirement that a business or trade be hazardous, or that an "accident" occur,
or that the injury occur in the course of and arise out of employment.
At some point about fifteen years ago, a virtually imperceptible shift seemed
to occur. Employers, perhaps not fully realizing the risk posed by increasingly
attractive tort remedies, began to agitate for reduced compensation coverage,
excluding a risk here, tightening a requirement for recovery there. While the
1975 amendments to the Act had been mostly pro-employee or at least neutral,
the 1983, 1988, and 1989 amendments were markedly pro-employer, reflecting
the legislative strength of the business community. Too little attention was paid
to the inevitable result of narrowing compensation remedies: if a workplace
injury was written out of compensation, it had little place to go other than back
into the tort system whence it came.
The initial opening was actually statutory in nature. When the so-called
"executive officer" tort suits were prohibited by amendment in 1976 and the
immunity of the principal was codified in the same year, the same amendment
exempted from tort immunity "liability, civil and criminal, resulting from an
intentional act."' This language, never previously in the Act, was somewhat
puzzling. Over time, it was interpreted to mean "intentional tort liability" in the
traditional, Restatement of Torts sense. It arguably might include "transferred
intent"' and did include vicarious liability of the employer for the intentional act
of a co-employee of the victim.' These were workplace injuries, but because
they had an overlay of intentional conduct, they were returned to (or perhaps
never removed from) the tort system.
But this was a legislatively-created exception to tort immunity, and the
judiciary had only to define the limits of that exception. For the most part, the
judiciary did an admirable job of restricting the exception to its intended, rather
narrow scope." But this narrow interpretation came against a background of an

1. La. R.S. 23:1032(B) (Supp. 1994).
2. See Citizen v. Daigle, 418 So. 2d 598 (La. 1982) (Watson, J., dissenting), for a discussion
of this concept.
3. This was aplausible interpretation, though not inexorable. It can be argued the vicarious
liability of the employer does not "result from ... an intentional act" on the part of the employer,
but rather from the legal concept of financial responsibility for the conduct of an employee. The
issue of vicarious liability was resolved in Jones v. Thomas, 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983), however,
against the employer. It is possible the 1989 legislative amendment that added Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1031(D) (Supp. 1994) might undermine this conclusion to some extent, since it provides
that "an injury by accident" is not to be considered as having "arisen out of the employment ... if
the employer can establish that the injury arose out of a dispute [as intentional torts often do] with
another person or employee over matters unrelated to the injured employee's employment." If, in
this view, the incident is legislatively declared not to arise out of the employment, then arguably there
-should be no vicarious liability for it on the part of the employer. The amendment was considered
during this term in a summary judgment context in Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 640 So. 2d 635
(La. App. 3d'Cir. 1994), and summary judgment granted for the employer in the trial court was
reversed. It seems obvious the majority was not fond of the amendment.
4. Wilson v. State, 628 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), decided during this term,
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"expansive reading of the Act itself. No one should be surprised if the narrow
interpretation of the exception should give way to a broader one, if the Act
continues to be interpreted narrowly.5
Apart from the intentional act exception to tort immunity, the legislature was
not very involved in expanding the access that an employee would have to the
employer in tort-at least in a direct fashion. Quite to the contrary, the
legislature for the last ten years has mostly restricted compensation remedies.
It wrote "horseplay" out of compensation coverage. It permitted the employer
to prove that a workplace injury "arose out of a dispute with another person or
employee over matters unrelated to the injured employee's employment" and
thereby to exclude compensation coverage.7 It narrowed the definition of
"accident" to exclude "gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration." ' It
tightened the requirements to permit recovery for mental injury caused by mental
stress, so that no compensation was payable unless the mental injury was the
result of a "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress" and is demonstrated
by "clear and convincing evidence." 9 Similarly, it limited recovery for mental
injury caused by physical injury by imposing a standard of "clear and convincing
evidence."' And in both instances of mental injury, it required that the injury
meet certain specific diagnostic criteria."
In a similar vein, heart-related and perivascular injuries were written out of
the Act unless it is demonstrated "by clear and convincing evidence" that (a) the
"physical work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the stress
or exertion experienced by the average employee in that occupation" and (b) the
"physical work stress or exertion, and not some other source of stress or
preexisting condition, was the predominant and major cause" of such an
injury.' 2 These amendments seem to have hady the desired effect; in a number

continues this narrow view, rejecting a prison employee's claim that her stabbing at the hands of an
inmate stated an intentional tort
claim against her employer.
5. There is some indication of this during this term in the decision in McKee v. Inspectorate
Am. Corp., 636 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 643 So. 2d 144 (1994). Over two
dissents, a five-judge panel held an exception of no cause of action may not be sustained to dismiss
an intentional-act tort claim. While there is certainly authority that such a dismissal should be rare,
such a flat prohibition seems inappropriate-but predictable.
6. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1990) (adding La. R.S. 23:1031(C) (Supp.

1994)).
7. Id. (adding La. R.S. 23:1031(D) (Supp. 1994)). See also Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station,
640 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
8. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1990) (amending La. R.S. 23:1021(l) (1985
& Supp. 1994)).
9. Id. (adding La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) (Supp. 1994)).
10. Id. (adding La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(c) (Supp. 1994)).
11. 1991 La. Acts No. 468, § I (effective Sept. 6, 1991) (amending La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(d)
(Supp. 1994)).
12. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1990) (adding La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) (Supp.
1994)).
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of decisions during this term, workers' compensation has been denied because
these heightened standards were not met.3
Through amendments to the schedule loss provisions, hearing loss due to
multiple trauma was also excluded, and awards for impairment of the usefulness
of a physical bodily function were limited to the respiratory system, gastrointestinal system, and genito-urinary system as contained within the thoracic or
abdominal cavities. 4 In another legislative act, degenerative disc disease, spinal
stenosis, and arthritis were specifically excluded from occupational disease
coverage. "
There was clearly a pattern in these enactments. Incidents which by
ordinary standards would be considered work-related were written out of the Act,
not because they are not work-related, but because they are thought not to be
sufficiently work-related to justify a compensation remedy. 6
One other observation is essential to this discussion. Before the Workers'
Compensation Act was five years old, a very important factual situation came to
the supreme court. A worker named Effie Boyer suffered a work-related
accident that was seriously disfiguring but not disabling; she was "scalped" when
her hair was caught in an unshielded belt in some machinery.'" The Act did
not then contain what is now Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(4)(p),
permitting recovery for such injuries; in fact, that section was passed after the
Boyer decision, probably to resolve the problem posed in that case. Thus, as the
Act then read, there was no remedy for Effie Boyer because there was no
disability, despite the fact that the incident was clearly work-related.
Was the court to say the work relationship brought the incident within the
Act and thus barred a tort suit against the "negligent" employer, even though
there was no remedy in the Act? Or was the court to say that a tort suit could
be permitted, despite the work relationship, because the Act provided no remedy
for her injury? Quite predictably, it said the latter,' 8 a result that apparently

13. Charles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 1366 (La. 1993); Nubles v. H&J Employment
Serv., 637 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Husbands v. Kiper, 640 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1994); Ellis v. Normal Life, 638 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994). Charles suggests exclusion
of such claims from compensation may lead to their inclusion in the tort system. Charles, 627 So.
2d at 1372 n.17.
14. 1985 La. Acts No. 926, § 1, No. 945, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1986) (amending La. R.S.
23:1221(4)(p) (Supp. 1994)). The latter of these amendments seemed clearly aimed at eliminating
back injuries from this provision.
15. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1990) (amending La. R.S. 23:1031.1(B)
(Supp. 1994)). Mental illness and heart-related or perivascular diseases were also excluded from
occupational disease coverage at the same time.
16. Certainly one could also argue such incidents are "personal" and not work-related, and thus
inappropriate for compensation; but this would seem to be a difficult argument to win as to most of
them.
17. Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory, 143 La. 368, 377, 78 So. 596, 599 (1918) (on
rehearing).
18. Id. at 380, 78 So. at 600.
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caused the legislature to enact what became Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1221(4)(p), closing that loophole.
Over time, perhaps because the loophole had been closed, the Boyer decision
was forgotten-but it was never repudiated. It still stands for the proposition
that when there is no remedy in the Act for a work-related injury, then there is
no immunity for the employer. 9 Knowing that this is still a principle applicable to workers' compensation and tort, it is not difficult to see what might
happen if, over time, compensation remedies for work-related incidents are

eliminated.
This process is now under way, and the pace quickened during this term.
One of the earliest clues came in Adams v. Denny's, Inc. 20 A waitress had
fallen during work, and the incident allegedly led to the death of her unborn
child. Building on the earlier opinion in Danos v. St. Pierre,2 which had
recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus, the court
permitted a tort suit by the parents. 22 This is a result superficially contrary to
the earlier Bergeron v. Amsterdam Casualty Co. decision, which had declined
to permit a tort recovery for a "miscarriage" because the incident that caused it
was "covered" by workers' compensation.
The court in Adams might not have fully recognized the import of its
decision. The mother's cause of action for wrongful death is her action, and she
is an employee. The action is not the non-employee child's. There was an
emotional loss to the employee for which the Act provided no remedy; therefore,
a tort claim was permitted. This is not unlike the rationale in Boyer, and not a

19. There were some later applications of the principle after Boyer. In Clark v. Southern Kraft
Corp.. 200 So. 489 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940), writ denied, No. 6281 (Mar. 3. 1941) and in Faulkner
v. Milner-Fuller, Inc., 154 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934), both decided prior to the time there was
coverage for occupational diseases, it was held a worker could sue an employer in tort for the
contraction of an occupational disease because there was no "remedy" in the Act for such a disease.
When the Act was gradually amended to cover occupational diseases, these cases likewise became
irrelevant, though their fundamental principles did not.
There are some contrary indications over the years, but in no instance was Boyer e.'er overruled.
In Bergeron v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 243 La. 108, 141 So. 2d 832 (1962), a worker who
suffered an injury and a miscarriage when she fell, but was disabled only about six weeks, sued in
tort for the miscarriage because the Act seemed to provide no remedy for that occurrence. Her claim
was rejected on the basis that some compensation was available to her. Id. at 116, 141 So. 2d at 835.
Perhaps this is distinguishable from Boyer because some compensation was available for at least a
part of her injury, if not for the miscarriage itself. Somewhat similar are decisions such as Atchison
v. May, 201 La. 1003, 10 So. 2d 785 (1942), in which non-dependent relatives surviving a deceased
worker were not entitled to sue the employer in tort even though the Act provided no remedy
whatsoever for them due to their non-dependent status. This problem, too, was later partially fixed
by the addition of a provision to pay at least surviving non-dependent parents a specific amount of
money upon a work-related death of their employee child. La. R.S. 23:1231(B)(2) (Supp. 1994).
20. 464 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (1985).
21. 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
22. Adams, 464 So. 2d at 877.
23. 243 La. 108, 141 So. 2d 832 (1962). See supra note 19.
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long step away from other kinds of loss for which there is no recovery under the
Act, even though the injury-causing event is work-related.2 4
In Connorv. Naylor IndustrialServices, s an appellate court seemed to take
the plunge by holding that if a certain type of injury is not compensable under
the Act (even though clearly work-related) because it does not fit into the Act's
definition of injury, then there is no tort immunity. 6 Ironically, Boyer was
never mentioned, though a modem per curiam supreme court decision was. 27
As noted earlier, a 1985 amendment to the Act had added permanent hearing loss
due solely to a single traumatic incident to those conditions for which permanent
partial disability (i.e., schedule loss) might be awarded.2 8 The amendment
might have been intended to clarify the issue of compensability, and might have
been designed to be sure such hearing loss through a single incident was
considered compensable. However, in the interpretation given to the amendment
in Connor, the expression of one remedy (compensation) for a single traumatic
incident was treated as the exclusion of that same remedy for repeated
exposure.29 It followed, then, that such injury throigh repeated exposure would
not have a remedy in the Act and, according to this logic and the Boyer
principle, the claimant could proceed in tort.
Thereafter, signs of the reaffirmation of the Boyer principle increased. In
Hunt v. Milton J. Woinack, Inc.,30 the appellate court held that a heart attack,
arguably work-related but not entitling the worker to a compensation remedy
(because the requirements for recovery had been significantly tightened in 1989
and were not met), could be the basis of a tort claim alleging failure to provide
a safe place to work. 3' These hints became a full-fledged story during this past
term.
In Bryant v. Giani Investment Co., 32 the appellate court
affirmed the
hearing officer's denial of a compensation claim by a worker who had been
subject to verbal abuse by her supervisor, concluding this was not "sudden,

24.

See Trahan v. Trans-Louisiana Gas Co., 618 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (holding

workers' compensation statutes do not bar a spouse's tort claim for alleged exposure to hazardous
chemicals on employee spouse's clothing); Cushing v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1281 (1990) (holding a work-related incident causing
injury to an employee in the late stages of pregnancy, and also causing injury to the fetus, was not
ground for denying the tort claim on behalf of the fetus, later bom alive).
25. 579 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 585 So. 2d 568 (1991). But see the
arguably contrary view in Swilley v. Sun Oil Co., 506 So. 2d 1364 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
512 So. 2d 1181 (1987) (disallowing tort recovery when injury is"covered," even though no benefits
are due for particular loss, such as sense of taste and smell).
26. Connor, 579 So. 2d at 1227.
27. Spillman v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 518 So. 2d 994 (La. 1988).
28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. Connor, 579 So. 2d at 1227.
30. 616 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 623 So. 2d 1309 (1993). There were no
dissents from the writ denial.
31. Id. at 761.
32. 626 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 852 (1994).

. 1995]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

unexpected and extraordinary stress" under the tightened requirements for
recovery for mental injury caused by mental stress. Thus, the appellate court
pointedly said, the plaintiff "must fall back upon such other legal remedies as
applicable law may allow her." 33 And in Charles v. Travelers Insurance
34
Co.,
the supreme court seemed to indicate its approval of this approach as
well. Holding that a stroke is a "perivascular injury" under the tightened
requirements for a compensation remedy, and thus affirming a denial of
compensation, the court noted in an interesting footnote that the legislature's
action in excluding compensation remedies might unintentionally expose
employers to the "more financially harsh" remedy in tort.35 And in Ellis v.
Normal Life, 36 the appellate court held the absence of a remedy in the Act for
a fatal heart attack because of the tightened requirements permits the claimant
to sue in tort. Boyer is cited and apparently is quite alive and well. 7
The opening of a gate in the fence between workers' compensation and tort
is not limited to cases such as these. This is made quite clear in the supreme
court decision this term, Weber v. State.3
In 1984, Weber contracted an
occupational disease for which his employer, the state of Louisiana, paid benefits
and medical expenses. Approximately four years later, his condition worsened
and his physician determined that his illness was terminal unless he had a heart
transplant. According to the recitation of the facts, the employer refused to pay
for the transplant. The Office of Workers' Compensation Administration
recommended its payment, but again the employer declined. Before anything
else happened, Weber died.39 His widow and children brought a wrongful
death action against the employer, and were met by the defense that this action
was barred by the tort immunity under the Act because there was a remedy for
arbitrary and capricious refusal to pay benefits and medical expenses. An
exception of no cause of action was granted and the appellate court affirmed. 0
The supreme court, however, took a different view. The majority opinion
reasoned that there were two damage-causing incidents. The first was the
contraction of the occupational disease; benefits for it were properly paid. The

33.

Id. at 393.

34.

627 So. 2d 1366 (La. 1993).

35. [W]e note the legislature's actions may have the result, albeit unintended, of exposing
some employers, in those cases where the plaintiff can prove the elements of his claim, to
the more financially harsh tort liability for those heart attacks and strokes now excluded
from compensation coverage, whereas under the prior jurisprudence, those same injuries
would have fallen under the scope of the Act.
Id. at 1372 n.17. Justice Marcus concurred, rejecting the notion tort immunity is tied to an actual
remedy within the Act. Id. at 1372 (Marcus, J.,
concurring).
36. 638 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
37. Id. at 425.
38. 635 So. 2d 188 (La. 1994).
39. id. at 190.
40. Id. at 190-91. The appellate decision is located at Weber v. State, 608 So. 2d 1016 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

second was the refusal to fund the transplant operation. The majority felt this

incident did not occur during the course of employment and only marginally
arose out of employment. Moreover, the majority concluded the remedy within
the Act for arbitrary refusal to pay did not envision intentional conduct that
arguably resulted in death. Thus, the majority reversed the lower courts and
created what it called a "narrow exception" to the rule that the penalties in the
Act for arbitrary refusal to pay are exclusive. That "narrow exception" is for

situations in which the conduct does not occur during the course of employment
and only marginally arises out of employment, and in which the employer knew
to a virtual certainty that the denial would cause death that would not otherwise
have occurred."'
There are still other indications. During this term, an appellate court took
a rather narrow view of the dual requirement of "in the course of" and "arising
out of" employment and thus permitted a tort suit against a co-employee and the
employer based on a lunch-hour, one-car automobile accident.42 While there
were also more traditional views taken during this term of the dual requirement,
limiting the claimants to compensation or granting it to them,43 it cannot be just
a coincidence that one appellate court took an unusual and much more narrow
view of the requirement. Somewhat similarly, two other decisions took a narrow
view of exclusivity, though not entirely without precedent, in the context of
claims by the families of hospital employees whose working conditions exposed
them to highly contagious diseases to which their families were then exposed."

41.
Weber, 635 So. 2d at 194. In her concurrence, Justice Kimball disagreed with the creation
of another exception of this type when the present exception for "liability of the employer resulting
from an intentional act" would have covered this conduct. Id. at 194-95 (Kimball, J., concurring).
42. Hill v. West Am. Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 1165 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 642 So. 2d 881
(1994). The issue before the court on summary judgment was whether the injured employee was
within the "course and scope" of her employment when the lunch-hour accident occurred, and thus
within the exclusivity provision of the Act. No one seems to have raised the issue whether vicarious
liability of the employer for the tort committed by the plaintiff's co-employee could exist if the
conclusion was reached-as it was-that the plaintiff was not in the course and scope of her
employment when she was injured.
43. Bosse v. Westinghouse Elec., Inc., 637 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 642
So. 2d 878 (1994) (dismissing claimant's tort suit after he tripped getting off an elevator owned by
his employer, when the elevator failed to level properly at the floor where he worked); Margin v.
Barthelemy, 638 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (allowing workers' compensation to a deputy
sheriff injured in pick-up basketball game on work premises during lunch hour when there was no
realistic possibility of any tort recovery).
44. Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hosp., 629 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ
denied, 635 So. 2d 1134 (1994); Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (1994). In Raney, a worker was exposed to hepatitis "B"
in the workplace. The court affirmed a tort judgment in favor of his family members whom he
unknowingly exposed to the disease. Raney, 629 So. 2d at 486. In Vallery, ahospital security guard
was exposed to HIV in the workplace. The court held the security guard's own claim, along with
his wife's loss of consortium claim, was barred by the exclusivity provision. However, the court held
the wife's own claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on her exposure to HIV after
having unprotected sexual relations with her husband before he knew of his exposure, could survive
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These latter decisions may be explained by the fact that the claimants who were
permitted to proceed in tort were not employees, but the decisions still represent
a view of the exclusivity provision that does not particularly favor the employer.
One should also note that the dual capacity doctrine appears to be making
a comeback, despite the fact that it seemed to have been legislatively repealed
in the 1989 amendments." In one case, actually antedating the 1989 amendments, a police officer employed by the City of New Orleans was permitted to
sue the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans in tort for injuries suffered
when his patrol car hit an open sewer manhole while he was in the course of his
police work. 6 In another,47 arising after the amendments, a security guard at
a hospital suffered a work-related injury and sought medical treatment at the

hospital. Alleging malpractice in the treatment, he sued the hospital in tort. The
supreme court eventually rejected the exclusivity defense of the hospital, basing
its decision on the dual capacity of the employer and contending that the
amendment prohibiting its recognition was aimed only at "true" dual capacity
cases in which the employer's capacity as employer was inextricably intertwined
with its second capacity. 8
Finally, one must observe the renewed interest in recent years in a portion
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032, which has been in the Act from its

inception, denying immunity to the employer for liability "to a fine or penalty
under any other statute."4 9 This was the basis for the interesting decision in
Cox v. Glazer Steel Corp.," discussed in this forum last year." In Cox, the
supreme court held a worker's settlement of his potential claims in tort and
workers' compensation against his employer did not preclude a subsequent suit
under another statute for discrimination against the handicapped, when his
employer allegedly refused to rehire him becausc of the consequences of that
workplace injury. The supreme court held in Cox that Louisiana Revised

an exception of no cause of action. Vallery, 630 So. 2d at 869.
45. It seems generally agreed that Act 454 of 1989, adding Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032(A)(l)(b), was intended to overrule Ducote v. Albert, 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988), which had
recognized the possible application of a dual capacity theory to permit a cause of action against a
"company doctor" who was a co-worker of the injured employee and who allegedly treated the
employee negligently for a work-related incident. That legislative amendment was applied
retroactively during this term by a 3-2 vote of a five-judge panel, which held the amendment to be
"interpretive." Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 631 So. 2d 698, 701 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ granted,
637 So. 2d 1039 (1994).
46. Roberts v. Sewerage &'Water Bd., 634 So. 2d 341 (La. 1994). The court distinguished
earlier, somewhat similar decisions in' Green v. Turner, 437 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983),
McGuire v. Honeycutt, 387 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 397 So. 2d 1364 (1981),
and Wright v. Moore. 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. IstCir. 1979), writ denied, 382 So. 2d 164.(1980).
47. Wright v. State, 639 So. 2d 258 (La. 1994).
48. Id. at 260.
49. La. R.S. 23:1032(B) (Supp. 1994).
50. 606 So. 2d 518 (La. 1992).
51. H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments in the Law, 1992.1993, 54 La.
L. Rev. 817, 821-23 (1994).
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Statutes 23:1032(B) does not bar "other statutory causes of action," particularly
those, unlike the compensation remedy, that are fault-based.5 2
The holding in Cox has led to attempts to expand this concept to reach other
statutory penalties. A judiciary faced with shrinking compensation remedies has3
been only too ready to entertain these attempts. In Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co.,
decided as this symposium was being written, the claimant sought punitive
damages against his employer on the basis of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3
and the alleged wanton disregard of public safety in the handling of hazardous
substances. He argued that Cox required this "penalty" against the employer to
fall outside the compensation scheme.m Both lower courts had rejected the
argument, but the supreme court accepted it,55 thus opening an entirely new
chapter in remedies for workplace injuries.
The opinion in Billiot is disturbing in a number of respects, but its newness
and space limitations prevent a comprehensive analysis in this forum at this time.
The opinion is certainly consistent with the trends discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, and indeed may be the culmination of them. The worker was burned
when he was sprayed with a hot chemical."6 The chemical would apparently
qualify as hazardous or toxic under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3, one of
Louisiana's limited punitive damages provisions." But the opinion treated his
injury as a result of the overheated state of the chemical, not its toxicity."
He sued his employer for punitive damages even though he could not recover
ordinary compensatory damages due to the exclusivity provisions in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1032. He argued that the exclusivity provision specifically did
not reach liability for a "fine or penalty under any other statute," precisely the
argument accepted in Cox. This did not, however, seem to be the basis for the
majority opinion. 9 The primary basis for the majority opinion seems to be the
debatable proposition that when the Louisiana Legislature enacted the exclusivity
provision in 1914, punitive damages were not a remedy known to our law, and thus
the legislature could not have meant to exclude an unknown. 6° The fact is that

52. Cox, 606 So. 2d at'520.
53. 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994).
54. Id. at 607.
55. Id. at 617-18.
56. Id. at 607.
57. La. Civ. Code art.
2315.3 provides, in pertinent part: "In addition to general and special
damages, exemplary damages may be awarded, if it is proved that plaintiff's injuries were caused by
the defendant's wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the storage, handling, or
transportation of hazardous or toxic substances."
58. The lack of causation between the toxicity and the injury does not prohibit the award of
punitive damages, according to the majority opinion in Billiot. This view-while interesting and

debatable-is beyond the scope of this discussion.
59. In his concurrence, Justice Lemmon states this as his basis for agreeing with the result.
Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604, 618-19 (La. 1994) (Lemmon, J.,
concurring).
60. Id. at 608-09. The majority cites four decisions for the proposition that Louisiana did not
recognize punitive damages in 1914: Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R.P. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027,
74 So. 541 (1917); Deslonde v. O'Hern, 39 La. Ann. 14, 1 So. 286 (1887); Dirmeyer v. O'Hem, 39
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punitive damages were awarded and affirmed in Louisiana in a series of cases from
1836 to 1899,6" and were discussed without reprobation as late as 1903.2 Thus
it seems doubtful that a legislator pondering the Workers' Compensation Act in
1914 could have concluded that because punitive damages were unknown or
forbidden, he need not worry about specifically prohibiting them in the legislation.
There are many other aspects of Billiott that deserve extended discussion, but
for purposes of this piece, the point is sufficiently made. Exclusivity is under attack
from all quarters.
All of the foregoing makes it impossible to pretend that there is no such thing
as a civil remedy other than workers' compensation for injuries arising out of a
workplace setting but no longer governed by the Act because of legislative or
judicial narrowing of the compensation remedy. 3 Such a remedy has always
existed, but has achieved special prominence in recent years and particularly during
this past term. Perhaps this prominence has nothing to do with the legislative
narrowing of the compensation remedy, but it hardly seems completely coincidental.
The writer will admit to a good deal of uneasiness about these developments,
and it has nothing to do with favoring one side or the other in the merits of the

La. Ann. 961, 3 So. 132 (1887); M.L. Byrne & Co. v. L.H. Gardner & Co., 33 La. Ann. 6 (1881).
These cases are doubtful authority for that proposition. One of them was decided in 1917, and
though it reviews prior jurisprudence, could hardly have been known to the legislature in 1914. None
of the other three contains what could be described as a square holding that punitive damages were
not recognized; at best, one of them might stand for the proposition punitive damages had been
recognized, were considered unusual, and were not the kind of damages at issue in the case before
the court. It should also be noted in passing that the hapless O'Hem, defendant in two of the pre1914 cases, appears to be a fellow who redefined the term overbearing landlord.
61.
Bentley v. Fischer Lumber & Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 451, 25 So. 262 (1899); Burkett v.
Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337 (1860); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447 (1852); Summers v. Baumgard,
9 La. 161 (1836). These awards were usually for what we would now call wrongful seizure, but this
line of cases comes to a mysterious end at the turn of the century.
62. In Patterson v. New Orleans & C.R.R., Light & Power Co., 110 La. 797, 34 So. 782
(1903), apassenger sued a streetcar company for injuries which he suffered because of the negligent
operation of the streetcar; the court believed the operator was intoxicated. A damage award against
the company was affirmed. Since the trial judge had noted in his reasons the award was to
recompense the passenger's personal injuries and to "warn" the company against future conduct, the
company argued these were punitive damages that could not be awarded. The court appeared to
disagree that they were punitive in nature, being in an appropriate compensatory amount. Id. at 80910, 34 So. at 787. But the court also said the case was an inappropriate one for an award of punitive
damages in any event because such damages would be imposed upon the company under vicarious
liability and not against the actual perpetrators of the wrong. Id. at 810, 34 So. at 787. Yet the court
did not say punitive damages were never appropriate or never recognized; rather, it said only the case
before it was inappropriate (or such an award. A thoughtful legislator reading that opinion and the
others in 1914 could well have concluded punitive damages had been awarded and affirmed in the
past, and could be again.
63. In another setting, the author has called this remedy a "comptort." H. Alston Johnson,
Presentation to the Summer School for Judges, Louisiana Judicial College, Sandestin, Florida (June
6, 1994).
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usual employer versus employee debate. Rather, it is dismay at the gradual
abandonment, without rational justification, of a system for compensating
workplace injuries which, for all of its vagaries, has served us very well for
eighty years. Surely, there is much more of this story to be told.
II. IMMUNITY OF THE PRINCIPAL

While we are on the general subject of immunity, there are developments as
well with respect to the immunity of the principal, or statutory employer. In this
area, too, there are continued indications that the judicial reaction to the gradual
legislative narrowing of the compensation remedy is a concomitant narrowing of
exclusivity.
Some brief background is necessary. The original Act did not specifically
grant immunity to a principal; it provided that a principal might have to pay
workers' compensation to the employee of an intermediary, if the work being
undertaken was part of the trade, business, or occupation of the principal. It said
nothing of tort immunity. The immunity was granted by the judiciary. In due
course, the immunity was codified in amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032 in 1976. More judicial interpretation followed until the opinion in Berry
v. Holston Well Service, Inc.,6 the culmination of a decade of judicial uneasiness over the breadth of the immunity. The decision might have been intended
only as a clarification and summarization of the jurisprudence. While it could
easily have been so read, it was not. The employee community saw it as the
death knell to the broad scope of the immunity, and the employer community did
not really disagree. So the employer community entered the legislative process
to effect a change, and probably intended to overrule Berry with the following
language, declaring that because the work in question is
specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary construction or simple
maintenance, is work that is usually done by contract or by the
principal's direct employees, or is routine or unpredictable, shall not
prevent the work 65
from being considered a part of the trade, business, or occupation of the
principal. This does not, one should suppose, mean that these factors are not to
be considered; rather, it appears to mean that no single factor, such as specialized
versus non-specialized work, may be used to defeat the defense of immunity
raised by the principal.6
This rather puzzling amendment spawned another debate. The prevailing
opinion about the amendment is not that which is expressed in the preceding

64. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
65. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1990).
66. This has been the writer's view of the amendments from the outset. This view appears to
be shared by Judge Politz in Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir. 1991).
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paragraph. Rather, each appellate circuit has expressed the view (in dicta or
otherwise), many during this term, that the language was a legislative overruling
of Berry and returned the law to a more liberal standard of tort immunity,
perhaps to the so-called "integral relation" test,67 which had prevailed even
before the 1976 amendment which codified the immunity for the first time.65
This is a curious position. The immunity was judicially created prior to
1976. It was codified in 1976 by amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032, which said simply that the employee's remedy was exclusive against
"any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such
principal." There was a "definition" of "principal," but it was merely a
restatement of the pertinent portion of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1061. That
section, prior to the 1989 amendments which are in controversy, recited simply
that the principal was a person who "undertakes to execute any work, which is
a part of his trade, business or occupation or which he had contracted to perform,
and contracts with any person, in this Section referred to as the 'contractor,' for
the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work
undertaken by the principal." 69 There is no reference to "integral relation," then
or now. Then came Berry; then came the 1989 anti-Berry amendments. Even
if one agrees that the 1989 amendments totally eviscerated Berry in all respects,
why should we assume that the statutory codification in 1976 is to be ignored in
favor of a pre-1976 jurisprudential view of the immunity?
While the appellate decisions, viewed broadly, might suggest an expanded
view of the immunity of the principal is being taken, there is evidence that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana does not agree. In one of the intermediate appellate
decisions announcing a return to the "integral relation" test after the 1989
amendments and therefore affirming a summary judgment in favor of the
principal under this arguably broader immunity standard, the supreme court
granted a writ and summarily reversed, saying:

67. This is usually traced to the opinion in Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d
852 (1950), in which it was said the principal was entitled to tort immunity if the injured employee
was performing services "in connection with work which was part of the business, trade and
occupation of ...[the principal], or so closely related thereto as to become an integral part thereof."

Id. at 460, 49 So. 2d at 854. The first part of that test is found verbatim in the statute, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1061, as it read prior to the 1976 and 1989 amendments. The second part is not
found in the statute at all-then or now.
68. See Picard v. Zeit Exploration Co., 636 So. 2d 922 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), rev'd 642 So. 2d
862 (1994) ;Vickers v. Cajun Concrete Servs., Inc., 634 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 637
So. 2d 487 (1994); Hanks v. Shell Oil Co., 631 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd, 635 So. 2d
1118 (1994); Moore v. Crystal Oil Co.. 626 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 632 So. 2d
758 (1994); Frith v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 249 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 617 So. 2d 932 (1993); Hutchins v. Hill Petroleum Co., 609 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1992); Carter v. Chevron Chem. Co., 593 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 596 So. 2d
211 (1992).
69. La. R.S. 23:1061(A) (Supp. 1994).
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Granted. Judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. Because there
are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the contract work was
part of the principal's trade, business or occupation, motion for
summary judgment is denied. Case remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in the past several years has been no friend
of the doctrine of the immunity of the principal. Given the discussion in the
preceding section of this symposium, why should this writ comment surprise any
serious student'of the Act? We have not heard the end of this topic; but unless
something changes the judicial perception of the present balance in the Act, the
chances are great that when that case or another comes back to the supreme court
on the merits, the immunity of the principal will not be broadly construed.
III. MISCELLANEOUS Topics

There are a few other decisions that merit brief mention. For those who still
want to know more about how the calculation of the sharing of attorney's fees
between the intervenor and the injured employee who have joined in a third-party
tort action should be made under Moody v. Arabie,7' the decision of the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Rabito v. Otis Elevator Co." is a
must-read. Alas, the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a writ and remanded
the case to the appellate court," although it does not appear that its concerns
had anything to do with the Moody issue. The opinion probably will tell the
reader more than she would want to know about the issue of fee-sharing.
The decision in White v. Louisiana State Penitentiary74 confirms a point of
view held by the writer for some time relative to the unilateral "conversion" of
benefits based on temporary total disability (ITD) to supplemental earnings
benefits (SEB). The claimant had suffered a back injury on September 15, 1985,
and began to receive benefits based on temporary total disability at that time.
He retired on August 1, 1986, but the "lTDbenefits continued through October
5, 1987. On that date, benefits were "reclassified" as SEB and continued at the
same rate until February 18, 1990, when they were terminated under the
authority of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(3)(d)(iii)."

70. Moore v. Crystal Oil Co.. 632 So. 2d 758. 759 (La. 1994).
71. 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986).
72. 633 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
73. Rabito v. Otis Elevator Co., 638 So. 2d 1075 (La. 1994). The jury in the case relieved the
defendant elevator company of any responsibility. The trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict awarding some SI million against the elevator company. The appellate court reversed
that money judgment in its entirety.
74. 634 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 1272. This is a provision which permits termination of SEB when the employee
retires, but only after payment of a minimum of 104 weeks.
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The hearing officer had noted in her reasons for judgment that the defense
offered no "reasonable reason" why benefits had been converted from TTD to
SEB, and she concluded that the change had been made so that the benefits
could be cut off after 104 weeks. She held that without a change in medical
condition or the identification of a job available which the claimant could
perform, there was no authority for an employer to reclassify benefits from TID
to SEB, even when there was no change in the actual amount being paid.
Accordingly, she concluded that "ITDbenefits should have been paid from the
date of the "reclassification" until July 15, 1991, when it was determined the
claimant was permanently and totally disabled; and that benefits based on that
permanent disability should have been paid from that date until a change in the
claimant's medical condition was proven. Penalties and attorney's fees were also
awarded.76
The appellate court affirmed without dissent, its opinion consisting largely
of a quotation of the hearing officer's ruling. This seems entirely correct. For
some reason, employers and insurers had assumed, at least under pre-1989 law,
that a unilateral reclassification of benefits from TID to SEB was permissible
so long as there was no decrease in the weekly benefits. There was no authority
for that position in the Act, a point recognized in the White decision."
Employers and insurers have been somewhat lax in the "shift" from TrD to
SEB; they have tended to permit TID benefits to continue longer than
appropriate. This is decidedly unwise, since the TTD benefits do nothing to start
the SEB "clock" of 520 weekly payments. But paying attention to a possible
"shift" does not mean it can be done unilaterally. It means that the employer or
insurer should seek a medical opinion as to whether TTD is at an end, document
that conclusion with appropriate reports, and then notify the claimant and the
Office of Worker's Compensation Administration that it is changing the
78
classification of the benefits accordingly.
The requirement that an injured worker seek the approval of his employer
and the compensation carrier for any compromise with a third-party tortfeasor
under penalty of forfeiting any future compensation benefits was examined in
Coolman v. Global Torque Turn, Inc.79 The worker was injured when another
motorist rear-ended his vehicle. Since he was on his lunch hour at the time,
there was a dispute about whether the incident was compensable. The employer
and the compensation carrier initially took the position that the incident was not
compensable.80

76.

Id. at 1274.

77. Id. at 1273.
78. Under post-1989 law, it might be possible to argue the six-month limit placed on TTD
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(1)(d) (Supp. 1995) would permit a unilateral shift so long
as no extension of those benefits has been sought by the Worker. As of this writing, there are no
cases.
79. 631 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 158 (1994).
80. Id. at 107.
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Because of that position, or at least contemporaneously with it, the worker
sought recovery against the offending driver. He was able to reach a compromise with that driver and her insurer without the institution of litigation. After
a conditional agreement on that compromise had been reached and the settlement
drafts had been issued for personal injury and property damage, the compensation carrier changed its mind about the work-relation issue and commenced
weekly compensation benefits, including making up all past-due benefits. After
that occurred, the worker executed a formal receipt of the settlement drafts and
release, documenting his settlement with the offending driver by an authentic
act."
When the compensation carrier found out about the settlement with the
tortfeasor, it terminated the weekly compensation benefits under the authority of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102(B) because the compromise did not have its
written approval. It offered to reinstate the benefits, as required by statute, if the
were reimbursed, subject to a cap of fifty percent of the
benefits it had paid
82
settlement amount.
The worker filed for resumption of the benefits, and the hearing officer
rejected the claim as premature because the worker had not complied with the
statutory "buy back." The worker argued that (a) the statute did not apply to
compromises reached prior to the initiation of litigation and (b) if it did, his
compromise was reached at a time when the employer and the carrier were
denying that his claim was compensable, making any request for their written
approval a futile effort.8 3 The appellate court properly rejected those arguments. Nothing in the statute suggested the narrow application sought by the
injured worker, and the policy behind the provision probably militates against it.
As to the date of the compromise (a somewhat closer issue), the appellate court
concluded that the agreement was final only when the authentic act was signed,
and thus came after the initiation of compensation benefits.8 4
Finally, the subject of rehabilitation obligations under the Act seems to be
attracting attention again, some of it rather heated. The writer has had occasion
to comment on this subject several times, both in this forum 85 and elsewhere
in this review.8 6 The general theme of these comments was that the statutory

81.
Id.
82. Id. The court's statement of this concept could be misleading, though accurate on the facts
presented. The statutory scheme entitled the worker to have his benefits reinstated ifhe pays back
all past benefits but need not do so past 50% of the settlement amount he has received. In this case,
the worker received more than $50,000 in benefits and only about $25,000 in the settlement.
Accordingly, he could hardly reimburse all prior benefits and not reach the 50% cap; the 50% cap
was the applicable limitation, and the court was simply stating the obvious.
83. Id. at 109.
84. Id.
85. H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments inthe Law, 1990-1991, 52 La.
L. Rev. 753, 759-60 (1992).
86. H. Alston Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the

Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669, 711-13 (1984).
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rehabilitation obligation seemed more extensive than employers believed, and that
employers might find some skepticism in the judicial system about their
commitment to rehabilitation-which might result in more rigorous enforcement
by the judiciary than otherwise might have been expected."1 It appears that this
prediction may be coming true.
8
is
The decision by the supreme court in Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater"
fairly typical, even though decided under the 1983 amendments, which created
the rehabilitation obligation, rather than the 1989 amendments, which modified
the obligation. The plaintiff suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of
workplace incidents. A rehabilitation counselling firm evaluated her and
produced a rehabilitation plan. Plaintiff preferred completing a four-year college
degree program in management; this was rejected by her employer. She declined
other jobs identified by the rehabilitation firm as available to her. The hearing
officer eventually determined that the jobs offered and declined were an
insufficient basis for termination of compensation, but the appellate court
reversed on that issue.8 9 The supreme court generally sided with the hearing
officer, noting that the "mere furnishing of a list of possible manager trainee jobs
does not constitute a program of meaningful rehabilitation, training and
education, at least as envisioned by the former [pre-1989] statute."'
In one circuit, the rehabilitation obligation has caused considerable
disagreement. Complicating the issue is the offset against workers' compensation that is authorized in certain cases when social security benefits are being
paid. In two of the decisions, 9' the employer was seeking to prove that the
worker was permanently and totally disabled so as to satisfy that threshold
requirement in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1225 for receiving an offset against
workers' compensation weekly benefits in the amount of social security being
received by the worker. Only a classification of total and permanent disability
will permit the offset.
In one opinion, City of Crowley v. Comeaux,92 the appellate panel reversed
the hearing officer's determination that the worker was totally and permanently
disabled and that the employer was entitled to the offset. The court pointed out
that the hearing officer had not considered rehabilitation options, and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1226(D) prohibited a conclusion of total and permanent

87. However, the curious deletions from, and additions to, the Florida source provisions
suggest some tinkering with the provision to temper its pro-worker slant. For the most
part, these changes seem unnecessary and unwise and could cast doubt on the depth of the
commitment of the employer community to rehabilitation.

Id.at 713.
88. 630 So. 2d 733 (La. 1994).
89. Id. at 737.
90. Id. at 740.
91. City of Crowley v. Comeaux, 638 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d
1355 (1994); Dodge v. LeBlanc, 640 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 641 So. 2d 206
(1994).
92. 638 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 640 So. 2d 1355 (1994).
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disability until such options had been considered. 93 The writing judge observed
that a thorough rehabilitation evaluation and effort was "at least as vital" to an
offset determination as it is when a determination of total and permanent
disability is being made in the worker's interest under Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1221. 9' A determination of total and permanent disability for offset purposes
favors the employer by permitting the credit; a determination of total and
permanent disability under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221 favors the
employee. Along the way, the writing judge fired what can only be described
as a shot across the bow of the employer community, an only-slightly-restrained
blast at what he saw as a double standard on the rehabilitation obligation.95
Suffice it to say that he wondered whether rehabilitation experts engaged by
employers work much harder to rehabilitate someone who is simply seeking total
and permanent disability benefits than they do when the issue is whether an
offset for social security benefits should occur because of the total and permanent
disability of the injured worker. He is clearly asking whether, if the worker is
totally and permanently disabled in the latter context, he should not be so
considered in the former contelt as well by the same standard of proof.
In the second opinion, Dodge v. LeBlanc,% the same judge returned to the
same topic in the same context, this time as one member of a deeply divided
five-judge panel. The majority of the panel affirmed the hearing officer's
determination that the employer had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the employee was totally and permanently disabled, and that the employer
was then entitled to the offset for social security benefits being paid to the
employee. The judge concurred in the result, pointedly noting that if the
employer's proof was satisfactory in this instance, then the same proof should
be satisfactory when the employee is seeking to prove entitlement to total and

93. Id. at 658.
94. Id. at 661.
95. We cannot help but ask whether the employer's affinity for using the rehabilitation
expert's testimony is somehow related to how the consultant is selected and compensated.
Although we do not propose to conduct a lengthy ex pane study, it is difficult to ignore
the apparent differences in treatment allotted claims files by certain rehabilitation experts,
whose thoroughness and conclusions seem to correlate more to the retainer's interest than
to any other factor. Compare, e.g., the limited work expended by the rehabilitation
consultant in this case, where it was in the employer's interest to conclude that the claimant
is disabled, to the far more thorough job performed in the previously unpublished [opinion
in another case, attached as an appendix.)
... Some day . . . this or another tribunal may be asked to consider whether under
certain circumstances a claimant's due process rights might not be unconstitutionally
infringed upon by a workers [sic] compensation scheme that in practice permits the
employer to gain advantage, possibly in the context of a rehabilitation consultant who has
demonstrated prejudice through years of testimony or whose firm is controlled or owned
by an employer or workers [sic] compensation insurer.
Id. at 661 n.2.
96. 640 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 641 So. 2d 206 (1994).
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permanent disability benefits under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221. 9, He
invited the supreme court's views on the general subject area, 98 an invitation the
high court has apparently declined.
He returned to the same theme a third time during this term in Autin v.
Hessmer Nursing Home.99 The appellate panel affirmed the hearing officer's
determination that the worker had established total and permanent disability, and
also affirmed the officer's refusal to award penalties and attorney's fees.'00
The judge in question dissented on that point, arguing that the employer's effort
at rehabilitation was meager and showed indifference toward the injured
employee's condition.' 0 1 Again, he suggested the supreme court consider the
issue whether "the laws of this state, favoring the 'true' rehabilitation of injured
workers (when possible) and originally intended for the benefit of the employee,
can be subverted to partisan advantage."'0 2 And, in a parting shot, he wrote:
From where I sit, reliance on such flimsy grounds for terminating
benefits is arbitrary and capricious per se. The time is right for the
Supreme Court to decree that rehabilitation experts, required by law to
be paid by the employer, must be selected' by the claimant or by a
nonpartisan. Otherwise, there will be nothing to prevent employers and
insurers from continuing to employ such experts, contemplated by the
"rehabilitation"needs,
law to assist the injuredworker with his or her
03
for exclusively partisan litigation purposes.'
The gentleman has a point. And the larger issue is one the writer has
tirelessly pointed out for almost twenty years. A: fair balance in the Act leads
to fair results and relative tranquility. An imbalance in the Act leads to judicial
tinkering and legislative unrest.

97. Id. at 361.
98. The Supreme Court has yet to decree what if any burden of proof the employer must
carry to show that it is entitled to an offset under LSA-R.S. 23:1225. (It may well be that
the burden of proof required of workers in LSA-R.S. 23:1221(2) and employers under
LSA-R.S. 23:1225 is identical.) Nor has it offered its view as to the likelihood of medical
recovery necessary to show (for purposes of LSA-R.S. 23:1225) that one is, legally
speaking, permanently rather than temporarily totally disabled. The instant controversy
would seem to lay bare these questions for its consideration.
Id. (Laborde. I., concurring).
99. 638 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
100. id. at 697.
101. Id. (Laborde, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 698. The emphasis-both the bold type and italics-is in the original.

